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 THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 
ADMINISTERED CONTRACTS, AND THE 
ILLUSION OF COMPREHENSIVE 
REGULATION 
THOMAS W. MERRILL* 
The 125th anniversary of the Interstate Commerce Act1 invites 
reflection on what it has contributed to our understanding of public 
regulation.  Perhaps the most important and enduring idea associated 
with the Act is what we may call the administered contract.2  At 
common law, transportation services, like other goods and services, 
were governed by ordinary contracts between customer and carrier.3  
Building on innovations in English and state railroad legislation, the 
Interstate Commerce Act developed a different form of contracting.  
Contracts for transportation services became public acts, understood to 
have the openness, generality, and binding force of public law.4  This 
concept of the administered contract soon spread to other public 
transportation and utility services.  It remains a feature today of what 
we loosely call public utility law.5  Ironically, rail transportation, where it 
all began, has reverted to ordinary contracting.  This aspect of the 
history of the Interstate Commerce Act—the rise and fall of the 
administered contract—tells us much about why the Interstate 
Commerce Act, despite all its flaws, was so widely emulated.  It also 
sheds important light on the appropriate domain of private and public 
law in the provision of services to customers. 
Ordinary contracts are obligations based on mutual assent between 
 
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. 
1. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
2. The term is not common in the law but is useful.  Cf. Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation 
and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976). 
3. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Connection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225, 253–58 (2002) (describing common law duties of common carriers). 
4. See Interstate Commerce Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 380–82. 
5. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1335–40 (1998). 
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identified persons.6  They are private undertakings in two senses.  First, 
they see the light of day only under special circumstances, such as a 
litigated dispute or public recordation to perfect a security interest.  
Second, the obligations that such contracts create are personal to the 
parties and ordinarily do not extend to third parties, except in unusual 
circumstances such as third-party-beneficiary contracts.  Ordinary 
contracts are enforced by courts and arbitrators, seeking to identify the 
parties’ agreement and to enforce it by its terms.7  Courts and arbitrators 
typically do not consider questions of social welfare or regard 
themselves as free to rewrite contracts in order to achieve a different 
outcome from the one agreed upon by the parties. 
Administered contracts, like ordinary contracts, are grounded in 
mutual assent.  A service provider offers service on stated terms and 
conditions; if a customer agrees, this creates an obligation binding both 
parties.  Nevertheless, administered contracts differ from ordinary 
contracts on many dimensions.  Unlike ordinary contracts, administered 
contracts are public undertakings.  They are filed in “tariffs” or 
“schedules” with an administrative body, and these tariffs must be 
posted in public places or otherwise made available for public 
inspection.8  Administered contracts are public in a second sense as well: 
They are regarded as offers open to any member of the public.  
Although an offer of service may be designed to meet the needs of a 
single customer, once the proposal is filed as a tariff, any person is free 
to avail himself of the service on the same terms and conditions.9 
Perhaps most significantly, administered contracts are understood to 
be public obligations.  Some of this is inherent in the preceding point:  
Once a service provider agrees to offer service on stated terms and 
conditions, and these are filed in a public tariff, the service provider is 
obligated to provide the service if it is requested.  Indeed, failure to 
provide the service when requested is a violation of law.10  But even 
more strikingly, enforcement of the contract is not given to courts, at 
 
6. 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:1, at 10–11 (4th ed. 2007). 
7. See, e.g., id. § 1.1, at 7–8 (collecting authorities); Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774–75 (2010); Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 
283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931). 
8. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 380–82; see also 1 HENRY 
S. DRINKER, JR., A TREATISE ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT §§ 238–250, at 353–70 
(1909) (describing tariff requirement). 
9. See DRINKER, supra note 8, at 354 & n.69. 
10. See, e.g., ICC v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 235, 252–56 (1911). 
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least not exclusively, but is subject to oversight and modification by a 
public administrative body.11  Such an agency typically has the power to 
review tariffs before they take effect for compliance with general legal 
requirements and to reject or modify tariffs found to be noncompliant.  
The agency can also bring civil enforcement actions and even initiate 
criminal proceedings against persons who provide services without a 
publicly filed tariff or who provide services or pay rates that deviate 
from the publicly filed tariff.12 
Finally, administered contracts are public obligations in the sense 
that they preempt contrary state law.  This feature of administered 
contracts is called the “filed rate doctrine.”13  The service provider and 
the customer may not mutually agree to deviate from the tariff on any 
dimension—that is, they are prohibited from modifying the tariff by an 
ordinary contract.14  And the customer may not bring an action in tort to 
recover for any loss or damage that has been disclaimed by the tariff.15  
This feature highlights the degree to which administered contracts 
function as an alternative to private ordering through the common law. 
The concept of the administered contract emerged from the central 
purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was to prevent 
“discrimination” in the provision of rail service.16  The principal cause of 
complaint against railroads was the perception that some customers 
were getting better deals than others for what were perceived to be 
similar services.  Specifically, high-volume, well-connected customers, 
 
11. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 11, 24 Stat. at 383 (establishing the Interstate 
Commerce Commission); id. § 13, 24 Stat. at 383–84 (“[A]ny person . . . complaining of 
anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this 
act in contravention of the provisions thereof, may apply to said Commission by 
petition . . . .”); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) (concluding 
that, even where shipper complaining of an unreasonable rate had the statutory option of 
complaining to either a federal court or the Commission, the former must refer the question 
of reasonableness to the latter, and thus creating the primary jurisdiction doctrine). 
12. See, e.g., Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers—Continuity and Disintegration in U.S. 
Transportation Law, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 27 & n.160 (1983) (citing Interstate Commerce Act 
provisions). 
13. See AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 221–24 (1998) (and cases cited). 
14. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 381 (“[W]hen any such common 
carrier shall have . . . published its rates . . . , it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to 
charge . . . a greater or less compensation . . . than is specified in such published schedule of 
rates . . . .”). 
15. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (“The rights as defined by the 
tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”); see also AT&T, 
524 U.S. at 226–27; Abilene, 204 U.S. at 435–48. 
16. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1332 (and sources cited). 
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such as the oil and steel trusts, were getting breaks that were denied to 
ordinary folks.17  The disparity in rates was endemic to the railroad 
industry, with its mixture of competitive and monopolistic routes.18  The 
central problem was how to allocate large fixed costs—such as roadbed, 
terminal expenses, and administrative overhead—to individual 
movements.  There was no clear answer to this problem.  Railroads 
naturally sought to allocate a higher proportion of fixed costs to 
shippers on monopolistic routes, like rural grain elevators, which had 
little ability to resist higher prices.  Railroads sought to allocate a 
smaller proportion of fixed costs to high-volume shippers like the oil 
and steel trusts, which typically had access to multiple transportation 
alternatives and could take their business elsewhere if rates got too 
high.19 
One strategy the Interstate Commerce Act took against this 
perceived inequity was to attack the problem directly, in the form of 
anti-discrimination obligations, long-haul/short-haul provisions (which 
forbade charging more for short-distance shipments than for otherwise 
identical long-distance shipments over the same route), and a general 
prohibition on unreasonable rates and practices.20  Enforcement of these 
substantive constraints, however, was difficult.  It was expensive to file a 
complaint charging a carrier with a violation of these provisions, or to 
persuade Interstate Commerce Commission (“Commission” or “ICC”) 
 
17. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1046–47 (1988) (“Most scorned and least defended 
were preferential rates for large favored customers, the most notorious being John 
D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company.”); cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1370 (2010) (noting that the 
monopolistic business practices of people such as Andrew Carnegie in the steel industry 
helped stimulate the reformist movement that led to the passage of the Interstate Commerce 
Act). 
18. See William G. Waters II, Evolution of Railroad Economics, 20 RES. IN TRANSP. 
ECON. 11, 18–21 (2007) (describing the railroad industry’s use of differential, or Ramsey, 
pricing models in which rates vary inversely with the elasticity of demand).  See generally 
William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 
AM. ECON. REV. 265, 277–78 (1970) (reviewing literature and analyzing Ramsey pricing in 
the railroad industry). 
19. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 56, 93 (1990) (“In [the] oil [industry], . . . competition between 
railroads increased the power of the large shippers; for the intense pressure exerted upon the 
railroads by their very high fixed costs led their operators to grant reduced rates . . . for 
higher-volume shipments.”). 
20. Interstate Commerce Act §§ 1, 4, 24 Stat. at 379–80. 
2012]    125 YEARS SINCE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 1145 
staff to commence an investigation.21  Once commenced, proceedings 
quickly bogged down in complicated evidentiary questions about cost 
accounting.  When courts began to recognize defenses based on 
“meeting competition,” success became increasingly hard to achieve.22 
A second strategy was the adoption of administered contracts.  If 
railroad service could be procured only through published contracts, 
these contracts were available to all, and deviations were strictly 
prohibited, then favoritism would become much more difficult.  The 
regime of administered contracts turned out to be much easier to 
implement and enforce than the substantive prohibitions against 
discrimination.  The courts, at the urging of the Commission, soon held 
that any provision of service without a tariff, any failure to file and 
publish a tariff before providing service, or any deviation from a tariff 
once it became effective was a per se violation of the Interstate 
Commerce Act.23  Railroad employees, shippers, agency officials, and 
courts could easily understand these rules and the consequences of 
violating them.  Administered contracts did not end differential 
treatment.  Carriers quickly learned to file tariffs tailored to specific 
endpoints, goods, and volumes, and so could continue to engage in 
differential pricing based on different competitive circumstances.  But at 
least the plague of secret rebates, kickbacks, and preferences, which was 
so disturbing to the public in the late nineteenth century, was brought to 
an end. 
The idea of the administered contract was wildly successful.24  Within 
the transportation sector, the idea spread from railroads to motor 
 
21. See DRINKER, supra note 8, § 299, at 416–17 (noting difficulty of convincing ICC to 
investigate one’s claim). 
22. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 233–34 (1896) (“[A]mong the 
circumstances and conditions to be considered . . . , competition that affects rates should be 
considered . . . in deciding whether rates . . . are or are not undue and unjust . . . .”); ICC v. 
Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 172–73 (1897) (“[W]ithin the limits of . . . good faith . . . 
and subject to the . . . prohibitions that their charges shall not be . . . unreasonable, and that 
they shall not unjustly discriminate . . . , the [A]ct . . . leaves common carriers . . . free . . . to 
adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce . . . .”); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Behlmer, 175 U.S. 648, 674 (1900) (“[T]he carrier may take into 
consideration the existence of competition as the producing cause of dissimilar circumstances 
and conditions . . . .”); cf. James B. Speta, Supervising Discrimination: Reflections of the 
Interstate Commerce Act in the Broadband Debate, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1198–1200 (2012) 
(recounting ICC’s consideration of context, including existence of competition, in 
determining whether railroad rates were unlawfully discriminatory).  
23. See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98, 101–03 (1895). 
24. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 5, at 1333–34 (and sources cited). 
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carriers, intercity buses, river barges, and airlines.  It leaped to other 
industries as various as stockyards, telephony, natural gas distribution, 
and electricity distribution.  It prevailed in a variety of federal 
regulatory schemes and was adopted by nearly all states as well. 
Explaining why the idea of administered contracts was so successful 
is more difficult.  Although the idea got its start in an industry 
characterized by a mixture of competitive and monopolistic routes, 
where differential pricing (i.e., “discrimination”) was rampant,25 it 
proved to be equally popular in industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics (electricity, natural gas distribution, and local telephony) 
and in industries that were inherently competitive and were regulated 
largely to protect some other industry from competition (motor carriers 
and river barges).  So the administered contract was not a regulatory 
response to any specific industry structure. 
Without doubt, administered contracts had some benefits.  The 
device was critical in stamping out the more blatant forms of favoritism, 
such as secret rebates, and this may have contributed in some measure 
to public confidence in the fairness of a rapidly industrializing capitalist 
system.  They made it marginally easier to initiate claims of 
discrimination, since all tariffs were theoretically available for inspection 
through the agency’s public documents room.  The reality, as I have 
suggested, is that even with this better access to evidence, claims of 
discrimination or long-haul/short-haul violations were very hard to win.  
Administered contracts made it possible to protest rate increases before 
they took effect, and to seek a stay from the Commission pending 
investigation.26  This probably provided customers somewhat more 
leverage than they had under a regime that allowed only reparations for 
rates already put into effect and later deemed unlawful.  But whether 
this had any widespread or permanent effect on the level of prices is 
questionable.  Overall, it is hard to pinpoint any significant tangible 
benefit associated with the widespread use of administered contracts 
relative to ordinary contracts. 
This is my theory: The regime of administered contracts created the 
illusion of comprehensive regulation without its associated costs.  
Forcing regulated firms to file and adhere strictly to tariffs satisfied the 
public’s demand that the government “do something” about abusive 
 
25. See generally Waters, supra note 18 (providing overview of railroad-industry 
economics). 
26. See, e.g., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 667–68 (1963). 
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practices in various critical network industries.  Every firm had to 
publicize every service offering in advance, and had to wait patiently for 
a short period (e.g., thirty days) to see if any customer would protest or 
the agency would suspend and investigate.27  The public was thus led to 
believe that the government was on top of the industry.  The reality was 
that all but a tiny percentage of tariff filings piled up, unread, in agency 
offices and later in warehouses.  Meanwhile, the administered-contract 
regime imposed a small deadweight loss on regulated firms, but 
preserved their autonomy to determine what services they would offer 
at what prices.  Administered contracts created the appearance of 
regulation while leaving the significant decisions unregulated, except in 
the most extreme cases.  In so doing, they avoided the sclerosis and 
inefficiency that would have accompanied any effort to nationalize these 
industries and run them as state bureaucracies, as happened in most 
other industrial democracies.28 
The regime of administered contracts under the Interstate 
Commerce Act came to an end fairly rapidly in a twenty-year period 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.29  Using “letters of understanding,” 
railroads began soliciting business from major shippers, such as utilities 
that burn coal provided by continuous-cycle unit trains running from 
mine head to power plant.  When disputes arose in which railroads 
attempted to argue that such letters were not binding because they were 
not filed as tariffs, courts were not amused.30  The ICC soon decided that 
such letters of understanding were presumptive evidence of reasonable 
rates and had to be reflected in tariff filings.  Administered contracts 
were effectively subordinated to ordinary contracts.  The Staggers Rail 
Act of 1980 expressly authorized the use of carrier–customer contracts, 
 
27. See DRINKER, supra note 8, § 229, at 339–40 (discussing thirty-day waiting period). 
28. See FRANK DOBBIN, FORGING INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE UNITED STATES, 
BRITAIN, AND FRANCE IN THE RAILWAY AGE 3–4 (1994) (contrasting American railroad 
policy with French nationalization efforts); Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1031 n.70 (“[M]any 
European countries had begun to socialize their railroad systems.”) (citing ARTHUR 
TWINING HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 236–37 
(1885)). 
29. See Thomas K. McCraw, Economic Regulation, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 207, 208 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001) (discussing railroad 
“deregulation” that began in the 1970s); see also Ari Hoogenboom, Interstate Commerce Act, 
in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY, supra, at 393 (same); Kearney 
& Merrill, supra note 5, at 1335–36, 1368, 1386 n.290 (same). 
30. See, e.g., Iowa Power & Light Co. v. United States, 712 F.2d 1292, 1295–96 (8th Cir. 
1983) (rejecting utility’s argument that rate agreed to in letter of understanding did not 
control because it was not filed as a tariff). 
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which quickly became the standard mode of doing business in the 
industry.31  When the ICC was formally abolished on January 1, 1996, 
tariff filing ended and rail service contracts were by statute returned to 
state courts to be treated like ordinary contracts.32 
What caused the demise of the administered contract in the context 
of the Interstate Commerce Act?  President Eisenhower’s interstate 
highway system may have been the most important cause, with the 
growth of the air transportation network playing a supporting role.  The 
convenience of the new highway system and the emergence of air travel 
quickly reduced intercity rail passenger transportation to a detail.  The 
railroads happily turned over all intercity operations to Amtrak, a 
federally subsidized corporation, in 1970.33  The vast growth in the 
transport of goods by motor carriers, along with the development of 
commercial air freight, meant that most shippers of commercial goods 
had competitive alternatives to rail transportation, even if, as before, the 
shippers were served by only one rail carrier.34  The primary exception 
consisted of shippers of bulk commodities such as coal, but these sorts of 
shippers were precisely the types of firms that could negotiate long-term 
contracts with rail carriers, and there was no reason to believe that 
administered contracts would provide them with better protection than 
ordinary contracts. 
In short, the administered contract disappeared once widespread 
dependency on rail transportation disappeared.  When the Interstate 
Commerce Act was adopted 125 years ago, multitudes of agricultural 
producers and small manufacturers were completely dependent on rail 
transportation to connect with the outside world, and fear of 
exploitation by railroads was rampant.  The regime of administered 
contracts helped to tamp down this anxiety, at least to a degree.  Once 
new transportation alternatives—car, motor carrier, and airplane—
opened up, the sense of dependency on railroads faded away.  It was 
only a matter of time before the ritual of tariff filing, publication, and 
 
31. Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 208, 94 Stat. 1895, 1908 (1980). 
32. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 102, 109 Stat. 803, 817 (codified 
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10709(c) (2006)). 
33. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301, 84 Stat. 1327, 1330 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (creating and empowering Amtrak). 
34. See Hoogenboom, supra note 29, at 393 (“Railroads declined after World War II, 
partly because minimum-rate regulation prevented them from competing successfully with 
motor and water carriers. . . .  [And] railroads’ . . . passenger service . . . had become 
unprofitable because of airline competition.”). 
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worrying about strict compliance with tariff terms came to be seen as an 
unnecessary regulatory burden, adding to the cost of rail transport with 
little or no offsetting benefit. 
If this analysis is correct, it suggests that the proper domain of 
administered contracts should be determined by economic dependency, 
even though, as noted, administered contracts were sometimes imposed 
without regard to such dependency.  The economic concepts of 
monopoly or market dominance are a relevant part of the inquiry.  But 
so is a more contextual understanding of vulnerability.  Someone is 
economically dependent on a service when that service is a necessity of 
economic life and is provided by a single firm or a single dominant firm.  
Railroads fit this description when the Interstate Commerce Act was 
adopted.  They do not, at least not for the vast majority of economic 
actors, today.  It is thus fitting and proper that the idea of administered 
contracts, which emerged under the Interstate Commerce Act, has 
today disappeared from the industry in which it was born. 
 
